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Introduction
Internet auctions (IA) have rapidly become a highly popular mechanism of exchange. The popularity of IA sites is partly due to the enlargement of the market for rare items. Since there are only a few buyers and sellers for such goods, creating an easily accessible nationwide or global market potentially improves the match between supply and demand. Nevertheless, also many standard commodities, such as notebooks, are sold through online auction sites. It seems intuitive that a seller is better off the larger is the extent of the market. Indeed, Bulow and Klemperer (1996) [4] showed that under the hypothesis of the Independent Private Values Paradigm (IPVP), the seller is better off by enlarging the market.
1 Similarly, from the buyer's perspective a larger choice of items and sellers is often the better.
One of the perhaps surprising facts of IA markets is the low number of active bidders, notwithstanding the popularity of the mechanism. Consider the well known Ockenfels and Most IA sites have two ways of bidding. First, there is the possibility to bid manually, which is the standard English auction mechanism. Second, the possibility of proxy bidding, in which a machine bids on behalf of the buyer, adds the Vickrey feature to the auction.
In multiple day English auctions not every manual bidder is continuously active. Some intervening bids might therefore not materialize, whereas these would be placed under proxy bidding. Nevertheless, whatever the exact number of the active bidders is, it is a rather low number. The potential bidders are those bidders who check the auction website with or without placing a bid. Potential bidders are in principle interested in buying the item, but may not be willing to pay the going price. Thus the number of potential bidders is much larger than the number of actual bidders. We will try to explain the low average number of active bidders relative to the potential extent of the market.
Consider the number of potential bidders n as the extent of the market. Under the independent private value paradigm (IPVP) we show that, under a mild additional assumption, the valuations of the active bidders forms a sequence of records and second records. By using the probability theory of records, we then prove that if the number n of potential bidders is large, the number of active bidders is approximately equal to 2 log n. This explains the relative inactivity, since (2 log n)/n → 0 as n → ∞. With this relationship in hand one
can address questions such as by how much the extent of the market has increased through the creation of IA.
The large amount of data generated by IA is conducive to empirical auction research.
A key difficulty in the analysis of IA data, though, is the fact that the number of potential bidders is unknown. Many standard auction models require the number of bidders as a known parameter for identification, see Krishna (2002) [7] . Paarsch (1992) [12] is a good example of an empirical study in which the number of bidders is known. Several empirical studies combine the data from multiple auctions to study the IA without knowing the number of potential bidders for a specific auction. However, this requires an extra assumption regarding the distribution of the number of bidders. [15] . Then both the second and the third largest order statistics can be observed.
While most empirical papers in fact proceed by pooling data across different auctions, tacitly assuming homogeneity in the distribution of valuations and numbers of potential bidders, we follow Caserta and de Vries (2005) [5] and study IA on a per auction basis.
But to be able to do this, we need that the number of potential bidders is relatively large.
The 2 log n rule would lend itself easily to empirical scrutiny if the numbers of active and potential bidders were known. Suppose that the number of page views can be used as an indicator of potential interest. Fortunately, some smaller sites do report this number. We will use this information to measure n and to test for the 2 log n rule via regression analysis.
The large IA sites such as eBay and Yahoo! do not record the number of page views and hence provide no direct information on the number of potential bidders. But information on the bid arrival time is often publicly recorded. We show that this information can be used to test the 2 log n rule indirectly, still using the per auction approach, under one extra maintained assumption. If potential bidders arrive according to a Poisson process, with a preference for auctions with short remainder time, then the asymptotic property of the inter arrival times implies the 2 log n rule. We also provide indirect evidence for the 2 log n rule using these bid arrival times.
Both the regression evidence and the indirect evidence via the bidding time for the 2 log n rule can be interpreted as a weak test of the IPVP. Alternative settings like common values and interdependent signals paradigms do not necessarily imply the specific record sequence which results under the IPVP. Thus insofar the 2 log n rule is not rejected, the evidence weakly supports the IPVP hypothesis. Notice that most tests of the IPVP contain several other maintained hypotheses, such as homogeneity across different auctions and the distribution of the valuations. Here we do not need to maintain these other hypotheses, except for the assumption regarding the response of the manual bidders in case they are overbid. But the test is still weak as it only looks at one implication of the auctions under IPVP and the alternative paradigms do not necessarily destroy the 2 log n rule, so that the alternative hypothesis is not well specified. In Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) [3] the IPVP is tested versus the common value pardigm by means of the winner's curse, which is more severe the larger the number of bidders. For rare coin auctions the common value paradigm is the natural null hypothesis as is pointed out by Bajari and Hortaçsu. In this paper we focus on laptops which a priory better fits the IPVP.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review certain aspects of IA. Identification strategies are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses bids as a record sequence.
Our main theorem in Section 5 gives the asymptotic distribution of the index of the record sequence. Section 6 discusses the empirical evidence of the 2 log n rule via the number of pageviews. Simulations and empirical evidence for the 2 log n rule via the timing of the bids are provided in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix A. An example clarifying some notation in the paper is given in Appendix B.
The Online Auction
In comparison to offline auctions, the IA exhibit three main differences: the bidding system, the termination rule and the reminder system. We discuss these features in the following three subsections.
The bidding system
IA sites usually permit a choice between alternative bid procedures. Most common is the choice between manual and proxy bidding. For a manual bid, the bidder just enters an amount higher than the currently prevailing price. Manual bidding is like the first price open ascending bid in an English auction. The system immediately places the bid at the amount which is entered. A proxy bidder (secretely) communicates the maximum amount he is willing to bid to the server of the auction site, after which the machine takes over the bidding for this bidder. The proxy bidding procedure captures the second price sealed bid mechanism studied by Vickrey (1962). Thus, if the newly entered manual bid is below the maximum willingness to pay of one previous proxy bidders, the system will raise the price to the minimum increment above the newly entered manual bid. Otherwise the manual bid becomes the currently prevailing price. Similarly, a new proxy bidder may find that he is immediately outbid by another proxy bidder. When two proxy bids are placed, the current price will automatically jump to the lower of the two maximum willingness to bid submissions plus the smallest possible increment.
The termination rules
There exist broadly two alternative termination rules. Either the auction ends after a pre- This rule is also applied to the new extension period. Thus the auction will only end once no bidding activity has occurred within the last ten minutes before the previous ending time, otherwise, the ending time is extended automatically. On the Yahoo! auction site the sellers can choose which of the two termination rules they adopt.
The influence of the different termination systems on the bidding strategy is considerable.
The fixed ending time on eBay invites strategic last minute bidding, called sniping. This avoids competition, since other bidders may be unable to respond due to a lack of time, see Ockenfels and Roth (2003) [11] . In the Amazon-style auction sniping is not observed.
The reminder system
Most IA sites have an email based reminder system to inform active bidders about the fact that they are outbid. This is particularly relevant for those active bidders who use the manual system. Since many of these auctions run for several days or even longer, those agents may rely on such automated signalling before becoming active again. With the reminder system, the IA for the manual bidder in effect becomes a continuous open English auction. But note that the English auction under the IPVP is strategically equivalent to a second price auction. Most IA sites go through great pains in trying to explain this equivalence, so that bidders are stimulated to use the proxy bidding. But given the strategic incentives for sniping with the fixed ending time, manual bidding is nevertheless often observed. Moreover, for items like collectibles for which the IPVP may not be appropriate, manual bidding may again be preferable for strategic reasons.
Maintained Hypothesis
Before we can come to the main theme of the paper, we first have to ascertain that the bid sequence is revealing with respect to the valuations. To analyze this issue for IA, first consider a hypothetical IA on which only the proxy bidding mechanism is available and to which the Amazon termination rule applies. Under the IPVP the weakly dominant strategy is to bid one's valuation. If bidders act in this way, each active bidder's valuation will be observed as his last bid, except for the winner.
Next, consider the hybrid IA with the possibility of manual bidding added to the proxy bidding mechanism. To ensure that the third largest and lower valuations are observed as actual bids in the case with manual bidding, we use an assumption introduced by Song (2004) [15] for identification of the third largest valuation. Suppose that when the third highest valuation bidder is overbid, he is immediately notified by the reminder system if he is bidding manually. This enables the manual bidder to respond directly. We will assume that the manual bidder indeed immediately counters with a higher bid as soon as he is overbid and as long as his valuation is above the current price. This assumption ensures that his valuation is observed as the second highest bid once the auction has terminated.
In this paper the analysis is in principle concluded on a per auction basis, i.e. we do not necessarily pool across different auctions by making homogeneity assumptions. To enable this analysis, we therefore like to use the bids from bidders other than the top three, to increase the information content. For this reason, we will assume that all the (active) manual bidders immediately respond to a counter bid:
. Each active (manual) bidder immediately returns to the IA and increases his bid as soon as he is overbid and his valuation is above the prevailing price.
We already noted that Assumption 3.1 is automatically satisfied when there are only proxy bidders present. For the manual bidders, as we discussed in section 2.2, they may have an incentive to bid later when there is a fixed ending time. However, with the Amazon style auction termination rule, the active bidders (both proxy bidder and manual bidder) have no incentive to wait. In this case, the assumption provides a lower bound to the number of active bidders. Without an immediate response, some other manual bids might intervene, whereas these would not be placed in the case Assumption 3.1 applies.
Given the Assumption 3.1, the currently prevailing price must be equal to the second highest valuation among all the potential bidders up to that moment. Therefore the current price faced by a new potential bidder must be the second highest valuation among all the potential bidders who were actively bidding earlier on. Hence, in order to motivate a new potential bidder to bid, his valuation must be higher than the current second highest valuation. This conclusion is summarized in the first proposition. 
Bids as a specific Record Sequence
Proposition 3.1 implies that the bids can be viewed as records of the valuations of the potential bidders. The sequence of bids constitutes a quite particular record sequence, which we can characterize. There exists a well developed theory of records in probability theory, see the book by Resnick (1987) [14] . This theory will be used to derive the novel 2 log n rule. We first introduce the concept record and 2-record sequence. Let i = 1, 2, · · · , n denote the order in which the n potential bidders check the auction site. Suppose the valuation of all potential bidders are i. . This index sequence is given by
where m is the number such that R i > 2 for all i > J(m), i.e. m is the number of active bidders. Then, the active bidders' valuations constitute the record and 2-record sequence
. An example to clarify the notation is presented in Appendix B.
Under Assumption 3.1, from Proposition 3.1 we get the following corollary. . Our main theorem studies the property of the index sequence {J(j)}. The proof is relegated to Appendix A. n potential bidders, the number of active bidders will be approximately 2 log n.
Theorem 5.1. As the number of potential bidders n → ∞, the number of active bidders
We make this result precise by studying the asymptotic behavior of J(m). To this end we first need to introduce two more sequences of random variables:
The number {ξ i } indicates whether the i−th potential bidder is an active bidder or not.
The sequence {N (i)} gives the number of active bidders among the first i potential bidders.
An example of these two other sequences is also shown in Appendix B.
The following two lemmas study the asymptotic normality of both the N (n) and J(m)
sequences. The proofs are given in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.1. With the notation N (n) defined in (4) , the sequence
is asymptotically standard normal, as n → ∞. 
Notice that N (n) is the number of active bidders, while n is the number of potential bidders.
Conversely, J(m) is the number of potential bidders when we do observe m active bidders.
Thus (5) gives the asymptotic relationship between the two sequences. This yields the 2 log n rule.
Rule 5.1 (2 log n). If the number of potential bidders n is large, the number of active bidders
is approximately equal to 2 log n.
The 2 log n rule relates the extent of the IA as measured by n to the market activity as measured by the number of active bidders N (n). In the empirical sections we will test for this rule.
The 2 log n-rule has implications for the time sequence of the bids in Amazon type auctions. Define the time at which a record or second record occurs as the entering time.
Obviously, the entering time is related to the index sequence {J(j)} Therefore, we assume that the Poisson arrival rate λ increases as time progresses according to the following function
where θ is the time preference factor, and where the beginning of the auction is at t = 0. Reversing time, θ can also be seen as the discount factor under continuous discounting. Since the Amazon type auction can be extended, we do not specify the end time. The time preference turns the homogenous Poisson arrival process into a non-homogeneous Poisson process with the instantaneous arrival rate λ(t), see, for example, Klein and Roberts (1984) [6] .
For this non-homogeneous Poisson arrival process, we derive the asymptotic form of the entering time process of the record and 2-record sequence. The result is presented in the following theorem. The proof of the theorem is again relegated to Appendix A. 
Initial Empirical Evidence from Pageviews
We provide some evidence for the 2 log n rule on the basis of some aggregate statistics from other studies and a Dutch auction site that reports the number of page views.
Aggregate evidence on the 2 log n rule
From the relationship between the number of active bidders and the number of potential bidders, (5), given a certain number of potential bidders, we can estimate the corresponding number of active bidders by the 2 log n rule. But how large is the set of potential bidders?
Clearly, the number of potential bidders is bounded, at least, by the size of the world population. Actually, a realistic number of potential bidders is likely to be much smaller, even though the internet has expanded the extent of the market. In Table 1 we provide some simple calculations for the number of potential bidders. The table shows that our rule implies that the number of active bidders should hardly ever exceed 50. Actually, a realistic upper bound is perhaps around 14, which is corresponds to around 1,000 potential bidders.
By comparing these numbers, we can see that, although the number of active bidders is relatively small, it does not mean that the extent of the IA market is small. In other words, the 2 log n-rule illustrates that the extent of market is considerable, and has possibly greatly benefited from the fact that these items can now be sold through the internet, facilitating national and even international reach.
Number of potential bidders (n) 6 billion 1 million 10,000 5,000 1,000 500 100
Estimates of active bidders (2 log n) Actually, the maximum is 13, which is below the guesstimate upper bound of 14. These data show that modeling the bidding process as a record and 2-record sequence, is a possible explanation for why there are mostly few active bidders participating in a specific IA.
Regression evidence on the 2 log n rule
On the large IA websites of eBay, Amazon and Yahoo!, the number of potential bidders is not reported. This hampers a direct evaluation of the 2 log n rule. Fortunately, on some websites a system is in place that reports the number of people who checked a specific 
where β 1 = 2, β 0 = 2 log p and is a negative number, ε n is asymptotically standard normal, while ε n is just asymptotically normal distributed with variance 2. The website provides data for N (np) and n. So we can use linear regression to verify whether (7) holds or not.
Moreover, the coefficient β 0 provides information on percentage of agents who choose the outside option. Note that we have divided both sides of (7) with √ log n. This ensures the homoscedasticity of the error terms, which would not follow from a direct specification of the BIN modified 2 log n rule.
We choose the specific category of laptops, since for these items the IPVP is a priori the natural setting. We used the advertisements in the period Jan.2006 -Mar.2006. We only look at auctions with at least 5 active bidders. This requirement was imposed to ensure that there are enough potential bidders, since (7) is an approximate relationship that applies only if the number of potential bidders is sufficiently large. In particular, considering that only a small proportion of potential bidders prefer to bid online due to the BIN feature, the requirement is useful to ensure a sufficiently large number of potential bidders. In total, 32 auctions qualified. The statistics of the number of potential bidders and the number of active bidders are shown in Table 2 .
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Median
The number of potential bidders 603.7 326.4 164 1331 552
The number of active bidders 6.9 2.3 5 15 6 Table 2 : Statistics of the data Linear regression analysis is employed to evaluate (7) . The result is shown in Table   3 . According to (7), we know that the theoretical value of the coefficients should be β 0 = 2 log p ≤ 0 and β 1 = 2. We test two hypotheses on the two coefficients: (7) and
The p-values of these two tests are shown in the last column in potential bidders choose not to directly negotiate via email, but instead prefer to bid first.
Thus, only a small percentage of the bidders in the end prefer the auction over the bargaining. Since the auction part of Marktplaats does not offer the proxy bid feature, active bidding can be very time consuming and, moreover, it reveals information to competitors.
Nevertheless, the estimated p is not zero since there are also costs associated with bargaining, i.e. bargaining with the seller can also be time intensive. Apparently the tradeoff between BIN and the auction is in favor of the bargaining process. But we do not want to pursue this issue further given the 2 log n rule being the topic of the paper and the fact that this is an advertising site.
Empirical Evidence from the Timing of the Bids
Under the assumption of Poisson arrivals, we can also test Theorem 5.1 indirectly via the timing of the bids. In Subsection 7.1 we run a small simulation study to illustrate the methodology. An empirical study on real data from a large IA site is given in Subsection 7.2.
Simulation
The simulation exercise starts by simulating the valuation of the potential bidders. We record the index sequence of the active bidders to illustrate Theorem 5.1. To this end we generate 10,000 i.i.d. random variables. We simulate from the uniform distribution, though we notice that choice of the distribution does not affect the record sequence. Then, by the definition of record and 2-record sequence, we find the corresponding index sequence {J(j)}. Figure 2 shows that the exponential distribution fits well. This is also confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test: the test statistics is 0.1333 with a corresponding p-value 0.9998. The simulation illustrates that the QQ-plot method can be used to verify whether an index sequence is really the index of a record and 2-record sequence.
To be able to apply this methodology on real data, we can not use the index sequence as it is not observable, but instead we can use the entering time sequence of potential bidders, as we discussed in Theorem 5.2. Hence, besides the valuation sequence, we also simulate the arrival process of the potential bidders. Following the discussion in connection with Theorem 5.2, we simulate the non-homogeneous Poisson arrival process. In this simulation we combine the {J(j)} sequence simulated above with the independently simulated nonhomogeneous Poisson arrival process {T (i)} with θ = 1.
2 Then we can use the simulated entering time sequence {T (J(j))} to replace the index sequence {J(j)}. By taking only the upper 2/3 of the differences, we can again make a QQ-plot, see Figure 3 . The KS test statistics is 0.2667 with a p-value 0.6781. The KS test again indicates a good fit, but of course due to the extra noise, the quality of the fit is somewhat lower. The extra noise due to the introduction of the non-homogeneous Poisson arrivals can also be seen by comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 . A cross plot of these two simulations is also made to check whether the distributions of these two simulated samples are about equal, see Figure 4 . The KS test for equality yields a p-value of 0.3885. Since the difference is not significant, it seems that the methodology of using QQ-plot to verify the specific record model is reasonable, even under the assumption of stochastic arrival times.
Empirical application
The methodology of subsection 7.1 is now applied to real data in order to verify whether the bidding process follows a record and 2-record sequence, in other words, whether Theorem 5.2 has a bite.
2 For simulating non-homogeneous Poisson process with a log linear rate function, see Lewis and Shedler (1976) [9] . Ranking the 9 active bidders' entering time, we take only the upper 2/3 as the relevant sample since our result only holds asymptotically. Hence, there are only 6 entering times under consideration. By taking the differences between these 6 entering times, with the assumption that the potential bidders come to the auction according to a non-homogeneous Poisson process, the 5 differences should be asymptotically i.i.d. exponentially distributed.
The estimated time preference parameter turned out to beθ = 0.007, which implies a halflife of 99 minutes.
3 By normalizing the mean to 1, we drew a QQ-plot with respect to the exponential distribution with unit mean, see Figure 5 . we combine all the normalized differences together and construct a QQ-plot with respect to exponential distribution with mean 1. The QQ-plot is given in Figure 6 . The KS test has p-value 0.378. Thus the null hypothesis of exponential distribution is again not rejected.
Therefore, also in lager samples, the 2 log n rule can not be rejected either.
Conclusion
Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. The number of potential bidders is the extent of the market. This number, however, is unknown to the internet auctioneer. In this paper, we study the connection between the number of potential bidders and the number of active bidders, in order to explain the low number of active bidders.
Our study started from the bidding process of the Amazon type IA. These IAs are a hybrid of the English auction and the second price auction, but without the strategic last minute bidding. Under the assumption that all active bidders are notified immediately when overbid and respond directly, the active bidders' valuations can be modeled as the Normalized difference between entering times Exponential distribution with mean 1 Figure 6 : QQ-plot for combined auction data record and 2-record sequence of the potential bidders' valuation sequence.
We proved that the logarithmic difference of the index of the record and 2-record sequence is asymptotically i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean 1/2. The number of potential bidders is thus connected with the number of active bidders through the 2 log n rule. Data from a small Dutch site were used to test for this relationship empirically.
On large IA websites such as eBay, Amazon and Yahoo!, the number of potential bidders is not reported. If, however, the potential bidders come to the auction according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process, then we can test for the 2 log n rule. Under the Poisson arrival process the publicly available entering time sequence of the active bidders can substitute for the logarithm of the index of the record and 2-record sequence. The empirical study using Yahoo! data supports the theoretical model, but showed quite some variation in the discount factor. Future research whereby this variation is explained by product characteristics seems of interest.
The 2 log n rule explains why there are usually few active bidders in an IA. Since the number of active bidders is logarithmically related to the number of bidders potentially showing interest for a particular IA, the extent of the market can be much larger than is revealed by direct observation of the active bidders. Table 1 shows that, with 10,000 potential bidders, 10 active bidders are within the 95% confidence band, but 25 active bidders are also compatible. Thus the extent of the market may at times be quite different given the activity levels in terms of the number of active bidders. In our sample, we never observed more than 11 active bidders. If 11 active bidders are considered as the upper bound of the confidence band, such a real activity is still compatible with as few as 21 potential bidders but also as many as 21,249 potential bidders. Thus the 2 log n rule explains the low observed bidding activity, but does not necessarily imply a very large number of potential bidders in a particular auction.
To see the economic relevance of the 2 log n rule, consider a case of a laptop IA where there are 500 potentially interested agents. Suppose the distribution of valuations is uniform on [0, 500].
5 By Table 1 , this implies that the expected number of active bidders is 12. If the seller were to calculate the potential gain from the auction by only considering the number of active bidders, he would arrive at 11/13 · 500 = 423.08$. This would be a considerable underestimate of the true gains. Since there are 500 potential bidders, the expected revenue is in fact 499/501·500 = 498.00$. This is 75$ higher than the back of an envelope calculated guesstimate on basis of the directly observed market extent. 
which implies that {J(j)} n j=1 is a Markov process. From (9), subsequently, Consider the family of random variables {M (t)/µ(t)}. Notice that as t → ∞, V ar(M (t)/µ(t)) = V ar(M (t))/(µ(t)) 2 = 1/µ(t) → 0.
So we get that M (t)/µ(t) → 1 in probability. Therefore, as t → ∞ M (t) e θt P −→ c, which implies that log M (t) − θt → log c in probability. 
